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RULES OF THUMB FOR 
INTERCREDITOR AGREEMENTS 
Edward R. Morrison∗ 
Intercreditor agreements frequently restrict the extent to which 
subordinated creditors can participate in the bankruptcy process by, 
for example, contesting liens of senior lenders, objecting to a cash col-
lateral motion, or even exercising the right to vote on a plan of reor-
ganization. Because intercreditor agreements can reorder the bargain-
ing environment in bankruptcy, some judges have been unsure about 
their enforceability. Other judges have not hesitated to enforce the 
agreements, at least when they do not restrict the voting rights of sub-
ordinated creditors. This essay argues that intercreditor agreements 
are controversial because they pose a trade-off: they reduce bargain-
ing costs (by limiting the participatory rights of subordinated credi-
tors), but can give senior lenders outsized influence over the bank-
ruptcy process, to the detriment of investors who were not party to the 
intercreditor agreement. The essay proposes several rules of thumb 
that might help judges navigate this trade-off. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Intercreditor agreements set out the relative rights and remedies of 
creditors extending financing to a common borrower. Some agreements 
coordinate the collection efforts of a syndicate of lenders with equal pri-
ority. These “syndication agreements” will appoint an agent with exclu-
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sive power to enforce the creditors’ rights against the borrower and allow 
a majority of creditors to direct the agent’s debt collection decisions. The 
legal issues emerging from syndication agreements have been addressed 
before.1 
Here I focus on issues emerging from intercreditor agreements that 
establish payment priorities, particularly among secured creditors. These 
agreements commonly go far beyond simply subordinating the repay-
ment rights of certain creditors. These creditors often give up collection 
rights. For example, the agreement may impose a standstill period during 
which only senior creditors may exercise remedies against a defaulting 
borrower. It may also allow senior creditors to release the subordinated 
creditors’ lien during a foreclosure sale. More controversially, an inter-
creditor agreement may waive or reassign rights that subordinated credi-
tors would ordinarily possess in the event of the borrower’s bankruptcy 
filing. These creditors may waive their rights to object to DIP financing 
provided by senior creditors, object to the sale or use of collateral, seek 
adequate protection, or file a plan of reorganization. An intercreditor 
agreement may even authorize senior creditors to vote the claims of sub-
ordinated creditors. 
These agreements are reordering the Code’s bargaining environ-
ment, and courts have been unsure whether to go along. The caselaw re-
veals conflicting views on intercreditor agreements, with some courts 
willing to enforce agreements that waive or assign bankruptcy rights, 
others less sure, and still others deeply skeptical of the agreements’ en-
forceability.2 Courts have good reason to be cautious about enforcing 
waivers and assignments of bankruptcy rights. Agreements with these 
provisions present a tradeoff. The upside is that they mitigate intercredi-
tor conflict, thereby reducing costs of restructuring and reorganization 
(and reducing the debtor’s cost of capital ex ante). The downside is that 
these agreements give senior creditors influence over the reorganization 
process that exceeds their economic stake in the outcomes of the process. 
They can vote the claims of both senior and subordinated claims, for ex-
ample, even though they have an economic stake only in the senior 
claims. When senior creditors have influence that exceeds their economic 
stake, courts should worry that seniors may use that influence in ways 
that are harmful to creditors who were not party to the intercreditor 
agreement. Seniors, for example, may strategically block an efficient plan 
of reorganization in an attempt to extract a higher recovery. 
Because waivers and assignments of bankruptcy rights present a 
tradeoff, the challenge for courts is to enforce them when benefits out-
 
 1. See, e.g., Paul J. Epstein, Beal v. Sommer: Did Decision on Collective Action in Exercise of 
Lenders’ Remedies Reflect Contracting Parties’ Intent?, 125 BANKING L.J. 240, 243–46 (2008); Michael 
R. Miller, Note, No Standing Room: How Lender Collective Action Subverts Basic Principles of Con-
tract Interpretation, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 330, 343–49. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
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weigh costs. This is a difficult task because it requires information that 
bankruptcy judges may not possess or have time to study. If a judge en-
forces an agreement barring objections by subordinated lenders, or al-
lowing senior lenders to vote the claims of subordinated lenders, what 
harm will be suffered by creditors who are not party to the intercreditor 
agreement? Rules of thumb may be helpful here and, indeed, may ex-
plain the divergent outcomes in the caselaw.3 In the paragraphs that fol-
low, I summarize this caselaw, discuss the trade-off facing the courts, and 
assess potential rules of the thumb.  
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES 
Looking across the cases, we see different approaches when judges 
face intercreditor agreements that waive or assign bankruptcy rights. 
One is to ignore provisions that reorder the bargaining environment, 
leaving aggrieved senior creditors to seek breach-of-contract damages in 
state court actions. This approach seems to derive from an intuition that 
Congress carefully designed a bankruptcy process with many checks and 
balances, such as the right of any party in interest to object to DIP fi-
nancing motions, the best interests test, class-based voting rules, voting 
rules that combine majority and super-majority thresholds, and the abso-
lute priority rule. An intercreditor agreement that bargains around these 
checks and balances may be sensible to the parties signing the agree-
ment, but harmful to nonsignatories because it eliminates resistance (by 
subordinated creditors) and prevents coalition-building (between subor-
dinated creditors and nonsignatories). 
This approach can seen in an early case addressing intercreditor 
agreements under the 1978 Code, In re Hart Ski Manufacturing Co.4 
There the intercreditor agreement governed the rights of creditors with 
liens on the same collateral.5 The court refused to enforce the agreement 
to the extent that it waived the subordinated creditors’ right to seek ade-
quate protection or file a lift-stay motion.6 Enforcing such a waiver would 
be “totally inequitable”: 
 The intent of § 510(a) (subordination) is to allow the consensual 
and contractual priority of payment to be maintained between cred-
itors among themselves in a bankruptcy proceeding. There is no in-
dication that Congress intended to allow creditors to alter, by a 
subordination agreement, the bankruptcy laws unrelated to distri-
bution of assets. 
 The Bankruptcy Code guarantees each secured creditor certain 
rights, regardless of subordination. These rights include the right to 
assert and prove its claim, the right to seek Court ordered protec-
 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4. 5 B.R. 734 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). 
 5. Id. at 735. 
 6. Id. at 736. 
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tion for its security, the right to have a stay lifted under proper cir-
cumstances, the right to participate in the voting for confirmation or 
rejection of any plan of reorganization, the right to object to con-
firmation, and the right to file a plan where applicable. The above 
rights and others not related to contract priority of distribution pur-
suant to Section 510(a) cannot be affected by the actions of the par-
ties prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case when such 
rights did not even exist.7 
Similar intuition was expressed in In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership,8 
on remand from the Supreme Court. There the agreement gave the sen-
ior lender the right to cast votes on behalf of the subordinated lender.9 
The court refused to enforce the vote-reassignment, emphasizing that the 
reassignment would destabilize the bargaining environment of the Code: 
 [S]ince bankruptcy is designed to produce a system of reorganiza-
tion and distribution different from what would obtain under non-
bankruptcy law, it would defeat the purpose of the Code to allow 
parties to provide by contract that the provisions of the Code 
should not apply . . . . 
 Subordination affects only the priority of payment, not the right 
to payment. If the assets in a given estate are sufficient, a subordi-
nated claim certainly has the potential for receiving a distribution, 
and Congress may well have determined to protect that potential by 
allowing the subordinated claim to be voted. This result assures that 
the holder of a subordinated claim has a potential role in the nego-
tiation and confirmation of a plan, a role that would be eliminated 
by enforcing contractual transfer of Chapter 11 voting rights.10 
This approach or “rule of thumb”—to be deeply skeptical of efforts to 
contract around the Code’s bargaining environment—continues to influ-
ence bankruptcy courts.11 
A very different rule of thumb is to enforce intercreditor agree-
ments in the same way that a court enforces any subordination agree-
ment: absent a prohibition in nonbankruptcy law or the Code, subordina-
tion agreements are fully enforceable in bankruptcy thanks to section 
510(a). A good illustration comes from In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC.12 
The court allowed senior creditors to vote the claims of subordinated 
creditors: 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 9. The agreement stated that the “[Subordinate Lender] hereby irrevocably agrees that the 
[Senior Lender] may, at its sole discretion, in the name of [Subordinate Lender] or otherwise, . . . file, 
prove, and vote or consent in any [bankruptcy] proceedings with respect to, any and all claims of 
[Subordinate Lender] relating to the [Subordinate Lender’s claims].” Id. at 328. 
 10. Id. at 331–32. 
 11. See, e.g., In re Croatan Surf Club, No. 11–00194–8–SWH, 2011 WL 5909199, *2 (Bankr. E.D. 
N.C. Oct. 25, 2011) (refusing to enforce a vote-reassignment provision, citing Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 
at 735, and 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 246 B.R. at 325); In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, 460 B.R. 4, 4 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (same), vacated in part on other grounds, 479 B.R. 210 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012). 
 12. 362 B.R 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). 
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Section 1126(a) grants a right to vote to a holder of a claim, but 
does not expressly or implicitly prevent that right from being dele-
gated or bargained away by such holder. Section 510(a) renders a 
subordination agreement enforceable to the extent enforceable un-
der applicable nonbankruptcy law. The Subordination Agreement 
appears to be enforceable under Georgia law, which is the applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
3018 and 9010 explicitly permit agents and other representatives to 
take actions, including voting, on behalf of parties.13 
Several other cases have applied similar logic.14 
Another line of cases takes the middle road. These cases do not in-
volve voting rights. They deal with intercreditor agreements that force 
subordinated creditors to remain silent during the Chapter 11 case. 
Courts have enforced these agreements to bar the creditors from seeking 
appointment of an examiner,15 objecting to use of cash collateral,16 and 
objecting to a reorganization plan.17 Initially, these cases look a lot like 
the previous decisions allowing senior creditors to vote the claims of 
subordinated creditors. The courts begin with familiar analysis: these in-
tercreditor agreements are unambiguous, enforceable under nonbank-
ruptcy law, enforceable in bankruptcy thanks to section 510(a), and not 
at odds with any provision of the Code.18 Why should a court “disturb the 
bargained-for rights” of senior lenders pursuant to a “plainly worded 
contract[] establishing priorities and limiting obstructionist, destabilizing 
and wasteful behavior” by subordinated creditors?19 
But the courts do not stop there. They have gone on to consider the 
merits of the motions or objections raised by subordinated creditors. In 
In re Erickson Retirement Communities, LLC, the court found that sub-
ordinated creditors had bargained away the right to seek appointment of 
an examiner, but nonetheless went on to consider the merits of the mo-
tion.20 We see the same move in In re Ion Media Networks, Inc. There the 
court held that the intercreditor agreement barred subordinated credi-
 
 13. Id. at 47. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Coastal Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 12–5683 (RMB), 2013 WL 3285936, at *6 (D. 
N.J. June 28, 2013); In re Curtis Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 192 B.R. 648, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys, LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 316–17 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) 
(“The Michigan Retirement System Entities are sophisticated commercial entities who knowingly 
waived all legal and statutory rights that would be in conflict with their obligation to ‘standstill’ until 
[senior lender debt] is paid in full.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. TOUSA Inc., Nos. 08–61317–CIV, 08–61335–CIV, 
2009 WL 6453077, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Ion Media Networks, Inc., 419 B.R. 585, 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The 
Transaction Documents make clear that [the subordinated lender], by purchasing second lien debt that 
was expressly subject to the Intercreditor Agreement, agreed to remain silent in the event of a chapter 
11 case.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Erickson Ret. Cmtys., 425 B.R. at 313–14. 
 19. Ion Media, 419 B.R. at 595.  
 20. 425 B.R. at 316–17. 
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tors from objecting to the reorganization plan.21 It then held that, even if 
these creditors had standing to object, their objections lacked merit.22 
Thus, while these cases purport to enforce the intercreditor agree-
ment, they give subordinated creditors precisely what they bargained 
away—the opportunity to object. To be sure, senior creditors retain the 
right to sue subordinated creditors for breach-of-contract damages.23 But 
measuring those damages is difficult. In Ion Media Networks, the court 
suggested that senior creditors could at least recover the increase in ad-
ministrative costs attributable to the objections filed by subordinate cred-
itors.24 But, demonstrating a causal connection between administrative 
costs and these objections will be hard, especially in a case like Ion Media 
Networks. When it considered the merits of the objections in that case, 
the court explained that it had an “independent obligation to review the 
Plan to make sure that it satisfies the standards for plan confirmation set 
forth in section 1129.”25 How, then, should we characterize the adminis-
trative costs associated with flyspecking the plan? Are they attributable 
to the subordinated creditors’ violation of the intercreditor agreement, or 
do they arise from the court’s independent duty to review the plan? 
But the more important question is whether courts should ever en-
force intercreditor agreements that waive or assign bankruptcy rights. 
We see different approaches (rules of thumb) in the caselaw, but the 
principles guiding these approaches are unclear. What harm arises when 
the parties write contracts that vary the Code’s bargaining environment? 
Is the harm greater in some contexts than others? 
III. A TRADEOFF 
It may be helpful to focus on a tradeoff presented by intercreditor 
agreements. These agreements reduce decisionmaking costs in the event 
of default, but also give senior lenders power to exploit subordinated 
creditors and potentially other investors in the firm.26 They reduce deci-
sionmaking costs by preventing subordinated creditors from objecting to 
 
 21. 419 B.R. at 595. 
 22. Id. at 598–603; see also Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. TOUSA Inc., Nos. 08–61317–CIV, 
08–61335–CIV, 2009 WL 6453077, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009) (finding first that the subordinated 
creditors lacked standing to object to the use of cash collateral, but holding that that objection was 
equitably moot, nonjusticiable, and lacked merit). 
 23. Donald P. Seberger, Subordination and Inter-Creditor Agreements, in SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS § 9.25 (Fishman et al. eds., 2013), available at http://www.iicle.com/links/Secured 
Trans07-10S-Ch9-Seberger.pdf (noting that a “senior lender is in a position to assert a claim for not 
only breach of contract but also breach of fiduciary duties if the junior creditor fails to comply with the 
payment terms of the subordination agreement.”). 
 24. Ion Media Networks, 419 B.R. at 590 n.4. 
 25. Id. at 598. 
 26. This tradeoff is presented by all decisionmaking rules, including majority rule, as Buchanan 
and Tullock emphasized. Majority rule reduces decisionmaking costs (relative to unanimous rule), but 
exposes the losing minority to exploitation. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, 
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY ch.8 
(1962). 
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proposals or otherwise increasing administrative costs, and by giving sen-
ior lenders power to act on their behalf. These effects on decisionmaking 
(or administrative) costs are important to the courts. In In re Ion Media 
Networks, for example, the court highlighted the “public policy” served 
by enforcing waivers of bankruptcy rights in these agreements: “Affirm-
ing the legal efficacy of unambiguous intercreditor agreements leads to 
more predictable and efficient commercial outcomes and minimizes the 
potential for wasteful and vexatious litigation.”27 The caselaw is littered 
with examples of such “vexatious litigation.”28 
But intercreditor agreements expose other creditors to exploitation 
because senior creditors can use their control over the subordinated 
claims to block efficient plans of reorganization, silence potentially im-
portant resistance to the sale or use of collateral, and prevent coalition 
building between subordinated and other creditors. Because senior credi-
tors control the bankruptcy rights of subordinated claims, but do not own 
those claims, they are undeterred from using those rights to destroy value 
for those claims and other investors. This is not worrisome if the only 
parties suffering harm are the subordinated creditors who bargained 
away their rights to object, presumably for compensation. But it is worri-
some if the harm extends to other investors—creditors and equityhold-
ers—who were not party to the intercreditor agreement. With respect to 
them, the intercreditor agreement imposes a negative externality. 
By silencing subordinated creditors, an intercreditor agreement can 
eliminate the most important resistance to collateral sales or financing 
motions, particularly first-day motions. Subordinated creditors may have 
superior information to general unsecured creditors because they hold 
security interests in the debtor’s collateral and have therefore more 
closely monitored the debtor’s condition prior to bankruptcy. If junior 
creditors become “silent second liens,” they cannot object to case devel-
opments that benefit senior lenders at the expense of all other creditors. 
To be sure, the affected creditors (and shareholders) can take steps to 
protect themselves by forming committees and objecting to motions filed 
by senior lenders. But it takes time for an unsecured creditors’ commit-
tee to form.29 It may also take time for the committee or other creditors 
 
 27. Ion Media Networks, 419 B.R. at 595; see also In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys, LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 
315 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (“This is the very type of obstructionist behavior that the agreements are 
intended to suppress.”). 
 28. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[A] cul-
ture has developed in large chapter 11 cases in which many consider it acceptable, and indeed ex-
pected, to use the litigation process as a means to assert or follow through on threats, and to seek vari-
ous kinds of relief, to secure ‘leverage’ in efforts to increase recoveries.”). 
 29. See, e.g., In re Shorebank Corp., 467 B.R. 156, 158 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (noting that the unsecured 
creditors’ committee was formed on March 2, 2012, about two weeks after the Chapter 11 filing on 
Feb. 15, 2012); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Nucor Corp. (In re SGL Carbon Corp.), 200 
F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Two weeks after SGL Carbon filed its petition and issued the press re-
lease, the United States Trustee formed a nine member Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.”). 
See generally Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the 
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to gather sufficient information to understand the consequences of mo-
tions filed by senior lenders. An intercreditor agreement may pose the 
greatest risk of harm to other creditors (those not bound by the agree-
ment) when senior lenders file first-day motions and the only creditors in 
a position to object are already silenced by the agreement. 
The intercreditor agreement may also allow senior creditors to ex-
ercise “hold up” power. Any creditor can threaten to hold up the bank-
ruptcy process—by filing objections, demanding valuations, seeking ap-
pointment of trustees or examiners—in order to extract better treatment 
(or a bribe).30 But the threat is not credible in many cases, because the 
threatened action may harm the creditor as much (or more) than it 
harms others. Think of the unsecured creditor who wants a higher recov-
ery and threatens to file numerous objections that will slow the case and 
burn firm value. Filing objections is costly, and any burn in firm value 
will often cause greatest harm to junior investors, including unsecured 
creditors and shareholders (because they are paid last in a system com-
mitted to the absolute priority rule). The unsecured creditor’s threat will 
be credible, then, only when the threatened action will disproportionate-
ly harm other creditors who are expected to receive recoveries through 
the reorganization process. When the threat is credible, these creditors 
might be willing to pay the unsecured creditor to settle the objections.31 
Senior creditors can make credible threats when they control the 
bankruptcy rights of subordinated creditors. They can vote the subordi-
nated creditors’ claims, or prevent them from filing objections, even if 
doing so reduces recoveries for these and all other investors. Suppose, 
for example, that seniors control the votes of junior creditors, whose 
claims are classified in a reorganization plan together with those of other 
creditors who are not bound by the agreement. If the junior creditors’ 
claims represent a sufficiently large share of the claims in the class, senior 
creditors will effectively control the class without actually owning any of 
the claims in the class. 
In other words, actions that would be irrational for a subordinated 
creditor will be rational for a senior creditor that controls but has no 
economic stake in the subordinated creditor’s claims. In re SW Boston 
 
Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749 (2011) (document-
ing the role of creditors’ committees in business cases). 
 30. See Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. at 58 (describing various techniques that have been 
used to hold up bankruptcy proceedings in order to improve recovery). 
 31.  The threat can be credible, for example, when junior investors are “out of the money” in the 
sense that they expect no payoff if the firm is liquidated or reorganized. In such a case, junior investors 
may try to delay ultimate resolution of the case in the hope that the firm’s value (or the judge’s ap-
praisal) will increase. Delay imposes little or no costs on these junior investors (because they are al-
ready out of the money), but they can benefit from it. This and other credible threats to delay the re-
organization process have been discussed by many scholars. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. 
Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 
1930, 1955–57 (2006); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in 
Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 785 n.107 (2011). 
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Hotel Venture, LLC,32 may offer an illustration. The debtor’s proposed 
plan had been accepted by all classes except the bank, which held a se-
cured claim and filed many objections to cramdown.33 The bank was par-
ty to an intercreditor agreement that gave it power to vote the claims of 
subordinated secured creditors.34 Although these creditors had submitted 
their own vote in favor of the plan, the bank sought to override their vote 
and vote their claims against the plan.35 The only effect of doing this was 
to raise the cost of cramming down a plan that had been accepted by all 
other classes, including several impaired classes, and that offered full re-
payment of the bank’s claim.36 Although the bank disputed the interest 
rate, the subordination agreement allowed it to recover any deficiency 
from the subordinated creditors, who were also being paid in full.37 Here, 
then, it appears that the senior creditors attempted to use the intercredi-
tor agreement to hold-up the reorganization process. 
The risk of exploitation by senior creditors is very similar to the 
risks associated with “empty voting,”38 which occurs when investors ac-
quire influence in a bankruptcy case—voting rights, standing to file ob-
jections—without owning claims or interests. They can do this through 
the use of financial derivatives. An investor, for example, can simultane-
ously purchase and short-sell a debtor’s shares or notes. Although it for-
mally owns shares (or notes), and therefore has voice in the bankruptcy 
process, the creditor has no meaningful economic interest in those 
shares. It has fully hedged its exposure to ups and downs in share price: if 
the price rises, the creditor owns a more valuable stock, but also has a 
more costly liability (the short). The two offset.39 Empty voting occurs 
when an investor votes or otherwise influences the bankruptcy case, but 
does not fully bear the costs or benefits of its influence. The investor can 
adversely affect the bankruptcy process by fostering inefficient plans or 
blocking efficient ones.40 
An inefficient plan, for example, could be confirmed along the fol-
lowing lines: suppose senior lenders propose a plan that is opposed by all 
other classes. Ordinarily, the plan would be unconfirmable—and would 
 
 32. 460 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 479 B.R. 210 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 2012). 
 33. Id. at 47 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 48. 
 36. Id. at 49. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Vot-
ing II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008). 
 39. Examples from recent cases are collected by Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy 
System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1649–50 (2009). 
 40. To be sure, empty voting may be substantially more worrisome than vote-assignment provi-
sions because empty voting is much less detectible. Intercreditor agreements can be read by the par-
ties. It may be impossible to know whether a creditor has fully hedged its exposure to a particular 
claim. Due to this lack of transparency, empty voting can make it much harder for parties to negotiate 
in bankruptcy. 
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not even be eligible for cramdown—because it violates section 
1129(a)(10), which requires that at least one impaired class vote in favor 
of the plan.41 An intercreditor agreement could be used to bypass this re-
quirement. By voting the claims of junior creditors, seniors can force 
their (impaired) class to vote in favor of the plan. 
The downside of intercreditor agreements (and empty voting) is 
clear: they potentially allow a senior lender to harm other creditors and 
the estate in an effort to increase its own payoffs. Intercreditor agree-
ments, in other words, foster a dictatorship by senior lenders. But a de-
mocracy may be no better. The upside of intercreditor agreements is that 
they prevent subordinated creditors from taking actions that increase re-
organization costs. 
Hence the tradeoff. The court’s job is to strike the right balance be-
tween minimizing decision costs and avoiding senior creditor exploita-
tion. 
IV. BALANCING THE TRADEOFF 
Because intercreditor agreements present a tradeoff, neither ex-
treme—always enforce or never enforce—is optimal. An ideal court 
would enforce waivers or assignments of bankruptcy rights when benefits 
outweigh costs. But an ideal court has complete information and the time 
and expertise to process it instantaneously. An ideal court also has dis-
cretion to make the appropriate tradeoff. Our world is different. 
It is different because the Bankruptcy Code may not give judges 
discretion to balance the tradeoff. Section 510(a) directs judges to en-
force subordination agreements in bankruptcy.42 This could be read as a 
mandate to enforce intercreditor agreements in toto. Alternatively it 
could be read as a mandate to enforce the subordination provisions of 
such agreements, but nothing else. The latter reading is plausible if we 
view section 510(a) as Congress’ effort to single out a particular inter-
creditor agreement for enforcement. By enforcing subordination agree-
ments, the argument goes, Congress was implicitly denying enforcement 
to other types of intercreditor agreements. Both readings of section 
510(a) leave little (or no) judicial discretion to balance (1) reductions in 
decision making costs, against (2) risks of exploitation by senior credi-
tors.43 
Even if judges lack authority to do this balancing, they can force the 
parties to do it instead. Consider, for example, a first-day motion for 
postpetition financing. Suppose senior secured creditors offer to supply 
 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a). 
 43. Section 105(a) offers little help here either, because the Supreme Court has made clear that 
it merely aids the court in carrying out other provisions of the Code. It is not an independent source of 
discretion. See Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014). 
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the financing, but with onerous terms such as a covenant requiring a 
quick sale of core assets. Junior secured creditors oppose the financing 
but are silenced by the intercreditor agreement. No other creditor has 
objected to the motion. The judge’s primary worry in a case like this is 
that she has not received sufficient information to evaluate the motion 
for postpetition financing. She is receiving one-sided information from 
the debtor (allied with the secured creditor). The proposed financing 
may be value-maximizing, or it may harm other creditors who are not yet 
sufficiently organized or informed to participate in the case. 
There is a simple solution to the judge’s problem: delay. The motion 
for postpetition financing is asking the judge to make an irreversible de-
cision. The judge, however, can wait to make that decision at a point in 
time when she has sufficient information to weigh the costs and benefits. 
The greater the uncertainty about the potential harm to the estate from a 
quick decision, the greater the value of waiting.44 Moreover, by waiting, 
the judge gives time for an unsecured creditors’ committee to form and 
for other stakeholders to file objections. In this way, the bankruptcy pro-
cess benefits from the intercreditor agreement (avoiding infighting 
among signatories to the agreement) without exposing the estate to 
harm. 
The judge’s ability to delay and gather information is a powerful 
way to minimize the downsides of many intercreditor agreements. If the 
primary effect of an agreement is to limit opposition to senior creditor 
proposals, the judge need only give time for opposition to form among 
creditors who have not signed the agreement. Even if judges lack discre-
tion to selectively enforce intercreditor agreements, they can demand 
greater delay when they are most concerned about the consequences of 
these agreements. 
Delay may be unnecessary when enforcement of the intercreditor 
agreement will affect only the allocation of payoffs among creditors that 
signed the agreement. For example, a provision barring juniors from 
challenging seniors’ liens will affect the relative payoffs of these credi-
tors, but is unlikely to harm creditors who did not sign the agreement. 
A judge might also be willing to enforce an agreement without de-
lay when the agreement’s signatories have security interests in all or sub-
stantially all of the debtor’s assets and their claims are deeply under-
secured. In a situation like this, where secured debt exceeds firm value, 
the only likely beneficiaries of the Chapter 11 process are the parties who 
signed the intercreditor agreement. There is likely little harm from en-
forcing the intercreditor agreement: it will bind the parties to their 
agreement, but have no impact on other investors, who are highly unlike-
ly to receive a recovery. 
 
 44. The judge, in other words, is deciding the optimal time to exercise a real option. See Douglas 
G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001). 
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Similar logic would imply that intercreditor agreements should be 
enforced whenever the bankruptcy case is primarily a battle between 
senior and subordinated creditors. In re 203 N. LaSalle Partnership may 
have been a case like this.45 The debtor’s creditors included a bank with a 
nonrecourse mortgage ($93 million), insiders with a nonrecourse mort-
gage ($11.3 million), priority tax claims ($2.3 million), and a small 
amount of unsecured debt (amounting to $90,000).46 If a judge were satis-
fied that, regardless of the outcome of the Chapter 11 case, priority tax 
and unsecured claims would be paid in full, this is just a fight between 
senior and subordinated creditors. 
There are a variety of difficulties with this rule of thumb. One is 
that, if the Chapter 11 case actually boils down to a fight among secured 
creditors, all of whom are parties to an intercreditor agreement, it is not 
clear why there is a bankruptcy filing in the first place. The filing might 
be an attempt by some signatories to gain an extracontractual advantage 
over others. If so, the case should be dismissed. The filing might also be 
an effort by the secured creditors to divert value from nonsignatories. 
This is precisely the negative externality that we worry about when the 
creditors seek enforcement of an intercreditor agreement. And, of 
course, there is a school of thought that Chapter 11 cases are never pure-
ly redistributional because postfiling increases in going concern value 
might belong to unsecured creditors.47 These considerations suggest that, 
even when secured debt appears to exhaust firm value, enforcement of 
the intercreditor agreement could harm investors who have not signed 
the agreement. A judge might want to delay making a decision until she 
is confident about the effects on those investors. 
Vote assignment provisions present special problems. These may 
pose the greatest risk of harm to investors who are not party to the inter-
creditor agreement. As discussed above, a senior creditor can block a 
plan, or overcome dissent, by voting the claims of junior creditors. In this 
way, seniors can use vote-assignment provisions to harm the estate and 
investors generally. Judicial delay is less helpful in this setting: when a 
senior files a motion that juniors cannot oppose (due to the intercreditor 
agreement), judicial delay gives other potentially affected creditors time 
to mount an objection. The judge can then decide whether to grant the 
motion. But when a senior proposes voting the claims of juniors, judicial 
delay offers little help. With or without delay, the senior creditor will 
vote the claims of juniors and that vote will determine the fate of the re-
 
 45. 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 46. These numbers are reported in Bank of Am. Nat’l. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. 
P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 438 (1999). 
 47. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Value of Soft Assets in Corporate Reorgnizations, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 509; Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589. At least 
one court agrees. See In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). But 
see Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After Rescap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 847. 
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organization plan (unless delay gives other creditors time to form a coali-
tion that can successfully resist the senior creditor). 
Vote-assignment provisions, then, present the most difficult chal-
lenge for bankruptcy judges. Some discretion is available here: a judge 
can designate votes that were not cast in “good faith.”48 Absent clear evi-
dence of abuse, however, it may be difficult for a judge to assess whether 
the senior is voting junior claims in order to maximize or hedge an eco-
nomic recovery (permitted) or to advance some ulterior motive (not 
permitted).49 
In this setting, where the risk of harm to other creditors is high, it 
might make sense for judges to deny the enforceability of vote-
assignment provisions. The Code already implements a complex, if not 
Byzantine, process for balancing decisionmaking costs against exploita-
tion risks. Even if an intercreditor agreement can improve on this bal-
ance, it does so without the knowledge or consent of creditors who have 
not entered the agreement. A primary virtue of the Code’s balancing is 
that it applies to and is anticipated by all parties. 
  
 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012). 
 49. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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